IS 2150 / TEL 2810
Introduction to Security

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Lecture 10
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Intrusion Detection,
Firewalls & VPN
Auditing System

Intrusion Detection



Intrusion Detection/Response

- Denning:
  - Systems under attack fail to meet one or more of the following characteristics
    1. Actions of users/processes conform to statistically predictable patterns
    2. Actions of users/processes do not include sequences of commands to subvert security policy
    3. Actions of processes conform to specifications describing allowable actions



Intrusion Detection

- Idea:
  - Attack can be discovered by one of the above being violated
- *Practical* goals of intrusion detection systems:
  - Detect a wide variety of intrusions (known + unknown)
  - Detect in a timely fashion
  - Present analysis in a useful manner
    - Need to monitor many components; proper interfaces needed
  - Be (sufficiently) accurate
    - Minimize *false positives* and *false negatives*

IDS Types: Anomaly Detection

- Compare system characteristics with expected values
  - Threshold metric: statistics deviate / threshold
    - E.g., Number of failed logins
  - Statistical moments: mean/standard deviation
    - Number of user events in a system
    - Time periods of user activity
    - Resource usages profiles
  - Markov model: based on state, expected likelihood of transition to new states
    - If a low probability event occurs then it is considered suspicious

IDS Types: Misuse Modeling

- Does sequence of instructions violate security policy?
  - Problem: How do we know all violating sequences?
- Solution: capture *known* violating sequences
  - Generate a rule set for an intrusion signature
- Alternate solution: State-transition approach
  - Known “bad” state transition from attack
  - Capture when transition has occurred (user → root)



Specification Modeling

- Does sequence of instructions violate system specification?
  - What is the system specification?
- Need to formally specify operations of potentially critical code
  - *trusted* code
- Verify post-conditions met



IDS Systems

- Anomaly Detection
  - Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) – successor is NIDES
  - Network Security MonitorNSM
- Misuse Detection
  - Intrusion Detection In Our Time- IDIOT (colored Petri-nets)
  - USTAT?
  - ASAX (Rule-based)
- Hybrid
  - NADIR (Los Alamos)
  - Haystack (Air force, adaptive)
  - Hyperview (uses neural network)
  - Distributed IDS (Haystack + NSM)

IDS Architecture

- Similar to Audit system
  - Log events
  - Analyze log
- Difference:
  - happens real-time - *timely* fashion
- (Distributed) IDS idea:
  - Agent generates log
  - Director analyzes logs
    - May be adaptive
  - Notifier decides how to handle result
    - GrIDS displays attacks in progress





Where is the Agent?

- Host based IDS
  - watches events on the host
  - Often uses existing audit logs
- Network-based IDS
  - Packet sniffing
  - Firewall logs



IDS Problem

- IDS useless unless accurate
  - Significant fraction of intrusions detected
  - Significant number of alarms correspond to intrusions
- Goal is
  - Reduce false positives
    - Reports an attack, but no attack underway
  - Reduce false negatives
    - An attack occurs but IDS fails to report



Intrusion Response

- Incident Prevention
  - Stop attack before it succeeds
  - Measures to detect attacker
  - Example: Jailing (also Honepots)
- Intrusion handling
  - Preparation for detecting attacks
  - Identification of an attack
  - Contain attack
  - Eradicate attack
  - Recover to secure state
  - Follow-up to the attack - Punish attacker



Containment

- Passive monitoring
  - Track intruder actions
  - Eases recovery and punishment
- Constraining access
  - Downgrade attacker privileges
  - Protect sensitive information
  - Why not just pull the plug



Eradication

- Terminate network connection
- Terminate processes
- Block future attacks
  - Close ports
  - Disallow specific IP addresses
  - Wrappers around attacked applications



Follow-Up

- Legal action
  - Trace through network
- Cut off resources
  - Notify ISP of action
- Counterattack
  - Is this a good idea?

Auditing



What is Auditing?

- Auditing systems
  - Logging
  - Audit analysis
- Key issues
  - What to log?
  - What do you audit?
- Goals/uses
  - User accountability
  - Damage assessment
  - Determine causes of security violations
  - Describe security state for monitoring critical problems
  - Evaluate effectiveness of protection mechanisms



Audit System Structure

- Logger
  - Records information, usually controlled by parameters
- Analyzer
  - Logs may come from multiple systems, or a single system
  - May lead to changes in logging
  - May lead to a report of an event
- Notifier
  - Informs analyst, other entities of results of analysis
  - May reconfigure logging and/or analysis on basis of results
  - May take some action



Example: Windows NT

- Different logs for different types of events
  - *System event* logs record system crashes, component failures, and other system events
  - *Application event* logs record events that applications request be recorded
  - *Security event* log records security-critical events such as logging in and out, system file accesses, and other events
- Logs are binary; use *event viewer* to see them
- If log full, can have system shut down, logging disabled, or logs overwritten

Windows NT Sample Entry

Date:	2/12/2000	Source:	Security
Time:	13:03	Category:	Detailed Tracking
Type:	Success	EventID:	592
User:	WINDSOR\Administrator		
Computer:	WINDSOR		

Description:
A new process has been created:

New Process ID:	2216594592
Image File Name:	\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE
Creator Process ID:	2217918496
User Name:	Administrator
FDomain:	WINDSOR
Logon ID:	(0x0,0x14B4c4)

[would be in graphical format]



Designing an Audit System

- Goals determine what is logged
  - Idea: auditors want to detect violations of policy, which provides a set of constraints that the set of possible actions must satisfy
  - So, audit functions that may violate the constraints
- Constraint p_i : *action* $\Rightarrow$ *condition*



Implementation Issues

- Show non-secure or find violations?
  - Former requires logging initial state and changes
- Defining violations
  - Does “write” include “append” and “create directory”?
- Multiple names for one object
  - Logging goes by *object* and not name
  - Representations can affect this
- Syntactic issues
  - Correct grammar – unambiguous semantics



Log Sanitization

- *U* set of users, *P* policy defining set of information *C*(*U*) that *U* cannot see; log sanitized when all information in *C*(*U*) deleted from log
- Two types of *P*
  - *C*(*U*) can't leave site
    - People inside site are trusted and information not sensitive to them
  - *C*(*U*) can't leave system
    - People inside site not trusted or (more commonly) information sensitive to them
    - Don't log this sensitive information

Logging Organization



- Top prevents information from leaving site
  - Users' privacy not protected from system administrators, other administrative personnel
- Bottom prevents information from leaving system
  - Data simply not recorded, or data scrambled before recording (Cryptography)



Reconstruction

- *Anonymizing sanitizer* cannot be undone
- *Pseudonymizing sanitizer* can be undone
- Importance
  - Suppose security analysis requires access to information that was sanitized?



Issue

- Key: sanitization must preserve properties needed for security analysis
- If new properties added (because analysis changes), may have to resanitize information
  - This *requires* pseudonymous sanitization or the original log



Example

- Company wants to keep its IP addresses secret, but wants a consultant to analyze logs for an address scanning attack
  - Connections to port 25 on IP addresses 10.163.5.10, 10.163.5.11, 10.163.5.12, 10.163.5.13, 10.163.5.14,
  - Sanitize with random IP addresses
    - Cannot see sweep through consecutive IP addresses
  - Sanitize with sequential IP addresses
    - Can see sweep through consecutive IP addresses

Firewalls & VPN



What is a VPN?

- A network that supports a closed community of authorized users
  - Use the public Internet as part of the virtual private network
- There is traffic isolation
  - Contents, Services, Resources – secure
- Provide security!
  - Confidentiality and integrity of data
  - User authentication
  - Network access control
- IPSec can be used

Tunneling in VPN





Perimeter Defense

- Organization system consists of a network of many host machines –
  - the system is as secure as the weakest link
- Use perimeter defense
  - Define a border and use gatekeeper (firewall)
- If host machines are scattered and need to use public network, use encryption
  - Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)



Perimeter Defense

- Is it adequate?
  - Locating and securing all perimeter points is quite difficult
    - Less effective for large border
  - Inspecting/ensuring that remote connections are adequately protected is difficult
  - Insiders attack is often the most damaging



Firewalls

- Total isolation of networked systems is undesirable
  - Use firewalls to achieve selective border control
- Firewall
  - Is a configuration of machines and software
  - Limits network access
  - “for free” inside many devices
  - Alternate:

    a firewall is a host that mediates access to a network, allowing and disallowing certain type of access based on a configured security policy



What Firewalls can’t do

- They are not a panacea
  - Only adds to defense in depth
  - Can provide false sense of security
- Cannot prevent insider attack
- Firewalls act at a particular layer

The Development of Firewalls First Generation

- Packet filtering firewalls
  - are simple networking devices that filter packets by examining every incoming and outgoing packet header
  - Can selectively filter packets based on values in the packet header, accepting or rejecting packets as needed
    - IP address, type of packet, port request, and/or other elements

Second Generation



- Application-level firewalls
  - often consists of dedicated computers kept separate from the first filtering router (edge router)
    - Commonly used in conjunction with a second or internal filtering router - or proxy server
  - Proxy server, rather than the Web server, is exposed to outside world from within a network segment called the demilitarized zone (DMZ),
- Implemented for specific protocols

Third Generation



- Stateful inspection firewalls,
  - keep track of each network connection established between internal and external systems
    - state and context of each packet exchanged (who / when)
  - can restrict incoming packets by matching with requests from internal hosts
  - Non-matching packets - it uses ACL rights to determine whether to allow the packet to pass

Fourth Generation



- A fourth-generation firewall, or dynamic packet filtering firewall,
  - allows only a particular packet with a specific source, destination, and port address to pass through the firewall
  - understands how the protocol functions, and by opening and closing pathways in the firewall
  - an intermediate form,
    - between traditional static packet filters and application proxies



Firewall Architectures

- For each type –
  - can be implemented in a number of architectural configurations
- Four architectural implementations of firewalls are especially common:
  - Packet filtering routers
  - Screened-host firewalls
  - Dual-homed host firewalls
  - Screened-subnet firewalls



Packet Filtering Routers

- Most organizations with an Internet connection
  - use a router between their internal networks and the external service provider
- Limitation
  - lacks auditing and strong authentication
  - complexity of the access control lists used to filter the packets can grow to the point of degrading network performance

Packet Filtering Router/Firewall



FIGURE 9-5 Packet Filtering Firewall

Screened-Host Firewall Systems

- Screened-host firewall systems
  - combine packet filtering router with a separate, dedicated firewall such as an application proxy server
  - Application proxy examines an application layer protocol, such as HTTP, and performs the proxy services
  - This separate host, referred to as a bastion host, represents a single, rich target for external attacks, and should be very thoroughly secured

Screened-Host Firewall



FIGURE 9-6 Screened-Host Firewall



Dual-Homed Host Firewalls

- In this configuration, the bastion host contains two network interfaces:
  - One connected to external network
  - One connected to internal network, requiring all traffic to travel through the firewall to move between the internal and external networks
- Network–address translation (NAT) is often implemented with this architecture
  - Converts external IP addresses to special ranges of internal IP addresses

Figure 9-7
Dual-Homed Host Firewall



FIGURE 9-7 Dual-Homed Host Firewall

Screened-Subnet Firewalls (with DMZ)

- consists of one or more internal bastion hosts located behind a packet filtering router, with each host protecting the trusted network