

Cybersecurity Intelligence Gathering, Sharing and Reacting

SAC-PA2

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SDAIA

ScienceDMZ Actionable Intelligence Appliance



SDAIA: NSF Award

- CICI: Secure Data Architecture: Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure
- ACI:1547249; Principal Investigator: Alex Withers
- December 1 2015 November 2018(estimated)
- Joint project between NCSA: Alex Withers(PI), Adam Slagell(Co-PI),
 Justin Azoff, Linh Cao, and PSC: Jim Marsteller(Co-PI), Shane Filus
- Development assistance from Wes Young, REN-ISAC



Project Goals - overview

- What is the SDAIA?
 - ScienceDMZ Actionable Intelligence Appliance
 - A virtual security appliance that will significantly enhance the security posture of open science networks.
 - Scalable, near real-time dissemination of threat intelligence.
 - Decentralized peer-to-peer model.
 - Collects and shares data, analyzes data in aggregate and creates new intelligence feeds.
 - Threats seen in multiple locations can provide sites an edge in threat detection.
 - Easy to deploy large ROI for sites with limited security resources.



Project Goals – requirements/specifications

- Appliance will be easy to deploy
 - Will not require specialized networking equipment (i.e. inline taps)
 - Distributed as ansible scripts that create and setup the appliance on any routable network(VM/bare metal).
- Uses "honeypots" to attract attacks and mimic available resources like ssh, http(s), gridftp, etc
- Instrumented with sensors to collect data(i.e. bro).
- Data is securely shared with other sites can create multiple mesh networks.
- Take active measures if desired
 - Interface with a Black Hole Router, firewall, email alerts, etc
- Share data with other sites!
 - The more data that's collected, the better the analysis and confidence on shared indicators.
 - Confidence levels on indicators can mean more meaningful action.




Appliance Architecture

Workflow

- ssh-auth-logger and Bro IDS collect indicators from SSH authentication attempts and network scans.
- Event logs are parsed and indicators are loaded into local CIF instance. Indicators are shared with other sites over a secure p2p network: can also be used for local policy enforcement (BHR, firewall rules, email alerts, etc).
- Indicators are also ingested from other sites: optional placement of indicators into local Bro Intel Framework or BHR.




Appliance Architecture






and Analysis


SSH brute force attempt: srcip 1.1.1.1 <login name list>



Site A



Site B



Site C




SSH brute force attempt: srcip 1.1.1.1 <login name list> Alert other sites Site C Site A Site B




SSH brute force attempt: srcip 2.2.2.2 <login name list>


SSH brute force attempt: srcip 1.1.1.1 <login name list>



Site A




Site B




Site C











Appliance Components

- ssh-auth-logger
 - Low interaction SSH honeypot written in Go.
 - Collects: src ip, username, password/pubkey, ssh version.
- Zyre (zeromq+p2p)
 - Very fast p2p 1:N message passing.
- Disco
 - Simple service discovery for key exchange and gossip
- CIFv3
 - Stores indicators/events.
- Apache Kafka
 - Message/event passing queue for extensibility.
- Bro IDS
 - Monitors network traffic going into honeypot.
 - Monitors and alerts on indicators seen at other sites.



Currently working

- Easy install
 - CentOS 7 fixes not in main distro(sdaia-xsede fork))
 SSH honeypot (ssh-auth-logger)
- p2p mesh/service discovery
 - Message passing between clients
 - Roll-your-own mesh
- Bro
 - Detects scans, uses indicators from mesh in Intel Framework
- CIF_v3
 - Stores indicators seen locally and via mesh
- Simple scripts to pull indicators out of zyre/mesh
 - Create bro intel files



In Development

- Kafka
 - Brings data together from other appliance components
 - Allows sites to read out data collected into custom ingest systems (i.e. Splunk/ELK).
 - Allows sites to write out data from other sensors and systems for sharing (i.e. BHR events).
- Bro sensor
 - Create intel events from detected port/address scans, etc
- Other honeypots for commonly used/SDMZ servies
 - Web auth, smtp, ftp, gridftp
- Usability/Integration
 - Make it easy to deploy, configure, and tie into site's existing infrastructure.
 - Building tools to adapt attack correlations across sites and assign appropriate confidence levels



Where is this being tested?

- Duke U
- NCSA
- PSC
- Lehigh U (testing)
- U of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (campus network)
- XSEDE (testing/development)



Additional Information/Links

- SDAIA Main Page
 - https://wiki.ncsa.illinois.edu/display/cybersec/SDAIA
- SDAIA github page
 - https://git.ncsa.illinois.edu/awithers/sdaia
- SDAIAkeys pubkeys/scripts
 - https://github.com/ncsa/sdaiakeys
- XSEDE SDAIA fork
 - https://github.com/filusATpsc/sdaia-xsede



Additional Tools



Additional Tools/Resources

- Collective Intelligence Framework https://csirtgadgets.com/collective-intelligence-framework/
 - "CIF helps you to parse, normalize, store, post process, query, share and produce data sets of threat intelligence."
- Malware Information Sharing Platform(MISP) https://www.misp-project.org
 - "A threat intelligence platform for sharing, storing and correlating Indicators of Compromise of targeted attacks, threat intelligence, financial fraud information, vulnerability information or even counter-terrorism information."
- Critical Stack https://intel.criticalstack.com
 - Build custom intel lists from various public feeds
- CTI-Toolkit https://cti-toolkit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
 - Convert between intel formats
- Ssh-auditor https://github.com/ncsa/ssh-auditor
 - Scan for weak SSH passwords on your network
- US-CERT Announcements https://www.us-cert.gov
 - Release IOCs for current threats
- REN-ISAC https://www.ren-isac.net
 - SES(curtailed public and private member intel), Passive DNS, Daily Watch Report