

# **Formal Verification/Methods** Lecture 9 Feb 26, 2013

### **Formal Verification**



- Formal verification relies on
  - Descriptions of the properties or requirements
  - Descriptions of systems to be analyzed, and
  - Verification techniques showing requirements are met by system description
    - Rely on underlying mathematical logic system and the proof theory of that system

### **Formal Approach**




- Formal Models use language of mathematics
  - Specification languages
    - For policies, models and system descriptions
    - Well-defined syntax and semantics based on maths
- Current trends two general categories
  - Inductive techniques
  - Model checking techniques
    - Differences based on
      - Intended use, degree of automation, underlying logic systems, etc.

## Verification techniques – Criteria for classifying



- Proof-based vs model-based
  - Proof-based
    - Formula define premises : embody the system description
    - Conclusions: what needs to be proved
    - Proof shows how to reach conclusions from premises
      - Intermediate formulas need to found to reach conclusions
  - Model-based:
    - Premises and conclusions have same truth table values
- Degree of automation
  - manual or automated (degree) & inbetween



#### Propositional

- Axioms
- Inference rules

## Verification techniques – Criteria for classifying

- Full verification vs property verification
  - Does methodology model full system?
  - Or just prove certain key properties?
    - Examples?
- Intended domain of application
  - HW/SW, reactive, concurrent
- Predevelopment vs post development
  - As design aid or after design



### Inductive verification



- Typically more general
- Uses theorem provers
  - E.g., uses predicate/propositional calculus
  - A sequence of proof steps starting with premises of the formula and eventually reaching a conclusion
- May be used
  - To find flaws in design
  - To verify the properties of computer programs

### **Model-checking**



- Systems modeled as state transition systems
  - Formula may be true in some states and false in others
  - Formulas may change values as systems evolve
- Properties are formulas in logic
  - Truth values are dynamic (Temporal logic)
- Show: Model and the desired properties are semantically equivalent
  - Model and properties express the same truth table
- Often used after development is complete but before a product is released to the general market
  - Primarily for reactive, concurrent systems

### Formal Verification: Components



- Formal Specification
  - Defined in unambiguous (mathematical) language
  - Restricted syntax, and well-defined semantics based on established mathematical concepts
    - Example:?
- Implementation Language
  - Generally somewhat constrained
- Formal Semantics relating the two
- Methodology to ensure implementation ensures specifications met



# **Specification Languages**

- Specify WHAT, not HOW
  - Valid states of system
  - Pre/Post-conditions of operations
- Non-Procedural
- Typical Examples:
  - Propositional / Predicate Logic
  - Temporal Logic (supports before/after conditions)
  - Set-based models (e.g., formal Bell-LaPadula)

### Example: Primitive commands (HRU)



Create subject s	Creates new row, column in ACM; s does not exist prior to this	
Create object o	Creates new column in ACM o does not exist prior to this	
Enter r into $a[s, o]$	Adds <i>r</i> right for subject <i>s</i> over object <i>o</i> Ineffective if <i>r</i> is already there	
Delete $r$ from $a[s, o]$	Removes <i>r</i> right from subject <i>s</i> over object <i>o</i>	
Destroy subject s	Deletes row, column from ACM;	
Destroy object o	Deletes column from ACM	11

## Example: Primitive commands (HRU)

Create subject s

Creates new row, column in ACM; s does not exist prior to this

Precondition:  $s \notin S$ Postconditions:  $S' = S \cup \{s\}, O' = O \cup \{s\}$ 

> $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset]$  (row entries for s)  $(\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$  (column entries for s)  $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)[a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

#### **Safety Theorems**





# **Specification Languages**

- Must support machine processing
  - Strong typing
  - Model input/output/errors
- Example: SPECIAL (from SRI)
  - First order logic based
  - Strongly typed
    - VFUN: describes variables (state)
    - OFUN/OVFUN: describe state transitions



### **Example: SPECIAL**



#### • Types

- Subject\_ID: DESIGNATOR;
- Object\_ID: DESIGNATOR;
- Access\_Mode: {READ, APPEND, WRITE};
- Access: STRUCT\_OF(Subject\_ID subject; Object\_ID object; Access\_Mode mode);

#### • Functions

- VFUN active (Object\_ID object) -> BOOLEAN active: HIDDEN; INITIALLY TRUE;
- VFUN access\_matrix() -> Accesses accesses: HIDDEN; INITIALLY FORALL Access a: a INSET accesses => active(a.object);
- OFUN give\_access(Subject\_ID giver; Access access); ASSERTIONS active(access.object) = TRUE; EFFECTS `access\_matrix() = access\_matrix() UNION (access);
- END\_MODULE



### **Example: Enhanced Hierarchical Development Methodology**


- Based on HDM
  - A general purpose design and implementation methodology
  - Goal was
    - To mechanize and formalize the entire development process
    - Design specification and verification + implementation specification and verification
      - Successive refinement of specification
- Proof-based method
  - Uses Boyer-Moore Theorem Prover

### Example: Enhanced Hierarchical Development Methodology

- Hierarchical approach
  - Abstract Machines defined at each level
    - Hierarchy specification in in Hierarchy Specification Language (HSL)
    - AM specification written in SPECIAL
  - Mapping Specifications in SPECIAL
    - define functionality in terms of machines at next lower layers
  - Hierarchy Consistency Checker
    - validates consistency of HS, Module Spec and Mapping Spec
- Compiler : programs for each AM in terms of calls to lower level
  - that maps a program into a Common Internal Form (CIF) for HDM tools
  - Two levels of spec translated to CIF  $\rightarrow$  correctness is verified (BMT)
- Successfully used on MLS systems
  - Few formal policy specifications outside MLS domain

### Levels of Abstraction






Formal Top Level Spec (FTLS)

### **HDM Verification**





#### **Used for MLS**

### **Boyer-Moore Theorem Prover**



- Fully automated
  - No interface for comments or directions
  - User provides all the theorems, axioms, lemmata, assertions
    - LISP like notation
  - Very difficult for proving complex theorems
- Key idea
  - Used extended propositional calculus
  - Efficiency to find a proof.



# **Boyer-Moore Theorem Prover**

### • Steps:

- Simplify the formula
  - Apply axioms, lemmata, theorems
- *Reformulate* the formula with equivalent terms
  - E.g., replace x-1, x by y and y+1
- Substitute equalities
- Generalize the formula by introducing variables
- Eliminate irrelevant terms
- Induct to prove

### **Gypsy verification environment (GVE)**



### Based on Pascal

- Formal proof and runtime validation support
- Focused on Implementation proofs rather than design proofs
  - verification of specification and its implementation
- Also to support incremental development
- Specifications defined on procedures
  - Entry conditions, Exit conditions, Assertions
- Proof techniques ensure exit conditions / assertions met given entry conditions
  - Also run-time checking

### **Other Examples**

- Prototype Verification System (PVS)
  - Based on EHDM
  - Interactive theorem-prover
- Symbolic Model Verifier
  - Temporal logic based / Control Tree Logic
  - Notion of "path" program represented as tree
  - Statements that condition must hold at a future state, all future states, all states on one path, etc.



## **Other Examples**



- Formal verification of protocols
  - Naval Research Laboratory Protocol Analyzer
    - For Crypto protocols
      - Key management (distribution)
      - Authentication protocols
- Verification of libraries
  - Entire system not verified
  - But components known okay
- High risk subsystems

### **Protocol Verification**



- Generating protocols that meet security specifications
  - BAN Logic
    - Believes, sees, once said
- Assumes cryptography secure
  - But cryptography is not enough